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prospects and educational attainment change as a consequence of exposure to the
Roma Teaching Assistant program. Our results show that parents of pupils in
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1 Introduction
Expectations for the future consistently affect choices made in the present. The social
environment where one lives plays a role in shaping expectations. The aim of this paper
is to examine the impact on parental expectations of a remedial education program for
primary school-age children targeting the marginalized Roma minority group. We study
expectations on returns to education and educational achievement as they affect future-
oriented behaviors and we are interested in investment in education. Roma people usually
attain very low education: primary school attendance rates are in the range of 40 to 60
percent in most countries (Brueggemann, 2012). Their upper secondary school completion
rates are even lower: only 1 percent of Roma adults aged 25 to 64 in Portugal, where
the rate is lowest, to 23 percent in Poland, where the rate is highest, have completed
compulsory upper secondary education. There is a clear low investment in education
among them, which can be due to financial constraints and the existence of barriers of
access to education.2 However, it is reasonable to assume that Roma people do not
invest in education because they may not expect schooling to give them enough future
opportunities. They might perceive that they face a ‘job ceiling’. In the formal job market
there is often discrimination against minority groups and they might not find a job even
with a high educational level attained. Conversely, the informal job market - where they
mainly work - does not often require any level of education: Roma people are primarily
involved in casual and seasonal jobs, performed without a written contract (see Section
2.1). The cost of investing in education would perceived to be too high as compared to the
discounted stream of expected future benefits. Therefore, there is no incentive to invest.
If we believe that educational and career expectations are important factors determining
one’s future educational attainment, then a policy intervention targeting a minority and
(Ref. ECO2014-58434-P) and the Serbian Ministry of education, science and technological development
(project number: OI 179015) is gratefully acknowledged. All opinions expressed are of the authors, all
errors are our own.
2Roma people often lack the required ID and face financial constraints. On average, costs associated
with schooling (books and other school material) in Serbia correspond to almost 2 percent of yearly
household income (LSMS 2003). In our sample of Roma people, these costs correspond to almost 6
percent of yearly household income. Moreover, some children face difficulties at school due to language
barriers. In the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey conducted by UNICEF in 2006, only 10 percent of
Roma declared Serbian to be their mother tongue.
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being able to change expectations can trigger higher educational attainment.
We first investigate whether expectations on labor market prospects and educational
attainment change as a consequence of exposure to the Roma Teaching Assistant program
(RTA), a remedial education program introduced in Serbia in 2009. We focus on parental
expectations because we argue that at such a young age (6 to 15) parents’ beliefs are
more relevant for a child’s educational attainment and more reliable for expected returns
to education than child’s expectations. Next, we investigate the potential channels for
these effects: remedial education and the role model mechanism. Parents have higher
expectations for their children because they perform better now thanks to the assistant.
Moreover, in the RTA program, all the assistants are Roma and from the same social
background as the pupils they help. In order to be assistants, they needed to invest in
education. Their successful experience can be shared with students and their parents
who will be motivated to believe that their children can achieve analogous results, thanks
to the investment in education. We find that parents whose children participate in the
program expect higher returns to education for their kids. They are also more likely to
expect them to achieve a secondary level of education.
For the purpose of our analysis, we have conducted an extensive survey with 300
Roma households in the capital of Serbia, Belgrade. In Fall 2010 we interviewed both
parents and their children attending 9 schools in 13 different settlements of the city.
The pupils interviewed were randomly selected among students attending the schools
involved in the program. The RTA program began in 2009 and we look at its impact
a year after its implementation. The program was introduced gradually: some schools
received their teaching assistant before others. Parents and children who attend schools
with the teaching assistant in Fall 2009 are our treated group. Parents and children who
attend schools that received the teaching assistant at a later point in time (Fall 2010)
are our control group. The allocation of Roma teaching assistants was not designed as
a randomized experiment: the program was designed in such a way that schools and
assistants had to apply to be part of it. Nonetheless, the phasing in of the program and
its selection characteristics mitigate concerns regarding the endogeneity of the selection
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process. Moreover, the preliminary analysis suggests that before the introduction of the
program the schools with treated and control children were similar in terms of observable
characteristics that could affect expectations. We also explore a second definition of
treatment because there is only one assistant per school and not every Roma child in
the treated school is helped by the assistant. A household is treated here if at least one
child is in a treated school and there is evidence from the survey that the assistant has
worked with the child. The assistant chooses the pupils to work with: they are not a
randomly selected subset of kids in treated schools. Therefore, being in a treated school
only captures the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect and can be used as a in instrumental
variable for being helped by the assistant. The local average treatment effect (LATE) we
estimate is the effect of treatment on the treated. In order to check the robustness of our
results we also employ a propensity score matching method. The analysis and results are
reported in section B.3. of the Online Appendix.
Knowing who is actually helped by the assistant also allows us to better investigate
the possible mechanisms leading to the changes in perceived returns we observe: the
remedial education channel and the role model mechanism. Parents likely expect their
children to go more to school because they perform better now thanks to the assistant.
Remedial education is effective. However, once we select the students performing badly
among both the treated and control schools, we still find higher expected returns to
education for pupils helped by the assistant compared to those not helped. The presence
of a person from the same social background sharing her successful story may affect
parents’ expectations about their children’s future. However, the lack of variation in
whether the assistant in the RTA program is Roma or not make more difficult to draw
strong conclusions in this respect.
Our paper is in line with the contributions on subjective expectations and informa-
tion gap between perceived and actual returns to schooling.3 Standard economic theory
suggests that, in the presence of perfect information, individuals choose their level of
3The literature suggests that this gap can also be filled by providing additional information through
statistics (Jensen, 2010). These tools turn out to be mostly cost−effective solutions rather than incentives,
like cash transfers or private school vouchers.
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education by equating the marginal benefits of education to its marginal costs. Underin-
vestment in education can be due to credit constraints, high discount rates or low school
quality.4 However, several works emphasized the importance of subjective expectations
(Manski, 1993; Jensen, 2010; Nguyen, 2008; Kaufmann and Attanasio, 2009). The returns
perceived by individuals affect schooling decisions. Yet, perceptions may be inaccurate,
due to limited or imperfect information. The paper is also related to the literature on
role models for minorities or disadvantaged people. In the nineties, a series of researchers
and policymakers advocated for an increased hiring of minority teachers in the United
States (Graham, 1987; Ladson-Billings, 1994), where the Black-White mark gap has been
intensively investigated. In fact, the relevance of having a teacher with the same back-
ground has been found to be significant in improving the achievement gap for minorities
(Dee, 2004). Our paper, together with its companion paper (Battaglia and Lebedinski,
2015), adds evidence on the short-term effects of remedial education programs target-
ing minority groups. It provides replicable examples in contexts where minorities suffer
low attainment rates and social exclusion, suggesting the role of targeted programs to
increase their educational attainment. For Roma people, for instance, this is the case in
many other European countries and so far there are few attempts to investigate how to
improve their life circumstances, in general, and of children, in particular. Furthermore,
we contribute to the existing literature by providing primary data in a context where
data are scarce.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides information on the
institutional setting and the Roma Teaching Assistant program. The characteristics of the
program are crucial to understand the possible mechanisms at play. Section 3 describes
the way the survey was designed and the data collected in order to carry out our analysis
and it provides some descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the estimation strategy
and results. Section 5 discusses our findings and suggests possible general implications
of the current research.
4See Glewwe and Kremer (2006) for an extensive summary on education in developing countries.
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2 Institutional setting and the Roma Teaching As-
sistant program
2.1 Education and the labor market
There are many reasons to believe that Roma people may underestimate the need to
invest in education. First, a large percentage of Roma live in segregated settlements.
Since they are isolated from the mainstream society, they do not often have different
models to which they can relate to in their immediate neighborhood (Wilson, 1987;
Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). This is confirmed by the 2002 Census data; 83 percent of
people who declared to be Roma live in census tracts where at least 7 percent of the entire
population is Roma (versus a country average of 1.44 percent). Second, it is extremely
rare that Roma people perform jobs for which high levels of education are required. In
Serbia, for instance, there are usually no teachers of Roma origin working in schools
and it is rare to find them working in public offices.5 Third, there is evidence that the
mean earnings of Roma workers are lower than those of Non-Roma workers, especially
for higher levels of education. Figure 1 reports average wages for the city of Belgrade
for Roma and Non-Roma. Data for Roma and Non-Roma come from different sources:
the Serbian Statistical Office provides earnings statistics for the whole population and
does not distinguish between different ethnic groups. These data are collected for jobs in
the formal sector that are not usually performed by Roma people and correspond in the
figure to those of the Non-Roma group. Data for Roma are calculated from our sample.6
This figure intends to simply provide a picture of the context and does not attempt to
be indicative of the exact amounts. The gap in real wages between the two groups is
unambiguous for every level of education and each gender.
[insert FIGURE 1 here]
5In our sample only 7 percent of women and 6 percent of men of working age perform jobs under a
full-time contract in the formal sector and none of them in the public sector.
6There are no official data on earnings coming from informal activities, which are mainly performed
by Roma people.
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Nonetheless, even if there is evidence of a gap between Roma and Non-Roma, among
Roma themselves there are large differences in average earnings across different educa-
tional levels. In our sample, for instance, average wages with secondary education are 27
percent higher than with primary education for men and 21 percent for women, and aver-
age wages with primary education are 29 percent higher than with uncompleted primary
for men and 21 percent for women.7 Moreover, the higher the educational level attained,
the better are the job market perspectives, both in terms of type of contract and place
where the job is performed. The data from the Living Standards Measurement Study
(LSMS, 2003) reported in Figure 2 suggest that these differences are substantial for Roma
living in Serbia. The top panel presents their types of contract by educational level. As
can be seen, 90 percent of men and 80 percent of women with a secondary education level
have got a written contract, while almost none works without a contract. Conversely,
among those with only primary schooling, almost 30 percent do not have a contract. The
bottom panel reports the places where jobs are performed. The percentage of those who
work in the street or in flee market reduces drastically with the level of education. This
is even more evident for women. The opposite pattern is observed when the workplace
is an office or factory.
[insert FIGURE 2 here]
Therefore, conditional on the fact that Roma people’s earnings are lower than those
of Non-Roma, there is still room for improvement based on education among Roma. The
more one studies, the higher the wages and the better the job conditions. However, it
is crucial to understand whether parents are aware of the actual returns to schooling. If
Roma people underestimate the outcomes of investing in education, a policy interven-
tion can be successful in increasing their expectations. Because we could not conduct a
baseline survey before the program was implemented, we need to look at data of parents
not affected by the program, assuming they are a comparable group for those affected.
Figure 3 reports the distributions of expected returns to education for parents whose
7For Non-Roma the average wages with secondary education are 49 percent higher than with primary
education for boys and 60 percent for girls. For Non-Roma we use 2011 data for the city of Belgrade
obtained from the Serbian Statistical Office (Serbian Statistical Office, 2010).
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children attend the schools that received the assistant in the second year of the RTA.
Their averages are shown in solid lines. The dashed lines correspond to average wages
of people in our sample by education. There are few women who completed primary
schooling and especially secondary school. Thus, the results for girls are less informative.
Official data do not provide this information.
[insert FIGURE 3 here]
The first panel reports the expected wage distributions, conditional on not having attained
any level of education. These distributions are more concentrated to the right of the
dashed lines of actual average returns, indicating that parents expect higher returns for
their children when no level of education is attained. The second and third panels of
the figure report the expected wage distributions, conditional on having a primary and a
secondary level of education, respectively. For boys, these distributions tend to be more
concentrated to the left of the dashed line of actual average returns. Thus, parents expect
for their sons less than what people with these education levels actually earn. There is
limited or imperfect information, and this likely fosters low expectations for Roma people.
2.2 The Roma Teaching Assistant program
The Roma Teaching Assistant program is the main program in Central and Eastern
Europe aimed at improving inclusion of Roma in education.8 After the initial pilot
phase, the program attained a wider coverage in the 2009/2010 school year.9 In Fall
2009, 26 primary schools (Early Enrollees) enrolled in the RTA program. In the following
year an additional 77 primary schools (Late Enrollees) joined. Each school receives one
teaching assistant. On average, the number of Roma per school is 75 (20 percent of
total pupils enrolled) and assistants work with one third of them, especially in the lower
grades. Although schools are free to allocate the assistants’ schedule, their major tasks
8For a more extensive description of the program see Battaglia and Lebedinski (2015).
9The Roma Teaching Assistant program started out as a pilot program implemented by various NGOs
in 2002. A total of 22 schools received an assistant at different points of time from 2002 to 2007. These
are not the same schools that had an assistant from 2009 onwards and are excluded from our analysis.
In 2007 the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) took over the coordination
and financing of the program. Beginning 2009 the RTA program had a country coverage and is now
coordinated by the Ministry of Education.
8
are helping children during regular classes and organizing extra, after-school classes. One
day per week the assistant visits the parents of children who are not attending school
and informs other parents about their children’s progress.
The RTA program was not designed by the Ministry of Education as a randomized
experiment: schools and assistants had to apply in order to be part of it. Yet, the
phasing in of the program and its selection characteristics mitigate concerns regarding
the endogeneity of the selection process. Schools were selected based on the following
two criteria: (1) a percentage of Roma pupils between 5 percent and 40 percent, and (2)
preferably the availability of a preschool program in the school.10 The requirements for
assistants are as follows: (1) secondary school attainment, (2) knowledge of Romani and
(3) preferably experience in working with children.11 It is not explicitly stated that the
assistant needs to be Roma: only the knowledge of their language is required. However,
all of them are of Roma origin. All the assistants live in the same municipality of the
school for which they work. Ideally we would have liked to randomly allocate the schools
in the two years and the assistants among schools. Since we could not intervene in the
phase of implementation of the program but only in its evaluation, what we can show is
that the phasing in of the program can be treated as if it were exogenous for the following
reasons. First, the selection criteria remained the same in both years and schools and
assistants which applied for the RTA program in the first year and did not get selected
could also apply in the second year.12 Second, schools applying before and after do not
10Information on the existence of a preschool program are available only for the 78 schools that applied
for the RTA program in 2009. For the 252 schools applying in 2010 this information was no longer
required. In that year 50 assistants were assigned to kindergartens which offer preschool programs.
Schools which were not offering the preschool program could have then been close to kindergartens
offering it and the Roma pupil would have been helped by an assistant from her entry in the school
anyhow. Since 2007, it is compulsory to attend a free preschool program for at least 6 months. In 2010,
this requirement was extended to 9 months. One could argue that this small change in requirements
could lead to a selection bias in the two rounds, but some schools without the compulsory program were
also selected in the previous year because it was not a binding requirement and some schools with the
preschool program were selected in the second year. Thus, our data mitigate this concern.
11Of the 158 candidates that applied in 2009, 26 were selected. In 2010, of the 329 applicants, 77 got
the job (and 50 more became assistants in kindergartens). Among the candidates belonging to the same
municipality of the school selected, detailed criteria based on level of education attained, motivation and
experience in working with children, were used to evaluate assistants. Thus, first the school is selected,
then the assistant.
12In Belgrade, the assistants who applied in the first round and did not get selected were not selected
in the second round either. Thus, concerns that more qualified assistants are selected first and the worst
in the second round are mitigated in our data.
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differ in terms of the only observable characteristic available to the selection committee:
in Belgrade, the percentage of Roma pupils was 14.37 percent in schools that applied
for the program in 2009 and 12.38 percent in the schools that applied in 2010. The
difference is not statistically significant (p-value=0.5791).13 Third, the schools selected
in the first year do not differ from the schools that were selected later in terms of their
observable characteristics. The same holds for the assistants. Table 1 reports the school
characteristics for the schools in our sample before implementing the RTA program.
[insert TABLE 1 here]
We collected data from nine schools in Belgrade, five of which received an assistant in 2009
and four of which received one in 2010.14 Early and Late Enrollees schools are similar in
terms of their observable characteristics.15 Before the introduction of the program, Early
Enrollees and Late Enrollees schools had a similar number of Roma per class, 4.75 and
5.75, respectively, a comparable class size (20.60 and 22.75 students, respectively) and a
similar percentage of Roma per school (23 percent and 24 percent, respectively). The sex
composition among Roma is the same: in Early Enrollees schools 53 percent of students
is female and in Late Enrollees schools 47 percent are female. As regards place of birth,
80 percent of Roma are born in Belgrade in Early Enrollees schools and 76 percent in
Late Enrollees schools. These characteristics are also comparable in the previous year,
with no statistically significant difference in any of the observable characteristics. The
descriptive statistics are reported in Table A of the Appendix. The characteristics of the
assistants in the two types of school are also comparable. Almost all of them are female
and have experience in NGOs. In Early Enrollees schools, 40 percent of the assistants got
13In all Serbia the percentage of Roma pupils is 13.99 percent in schools which applied in 2009 and 13.08
percent in schools which applied in 2010. The difference is not statistically significant (p-value=0.4581).
For schools that applied and did not get selected, this is the only information available, together with
their size. In Belgrade, the schools applying in 2009 had, on average, 780 pupils, while those applying
in 2010 had 657 pupils. The difference is not statistically significant (p-value=0.5226).
14Six schools in Belgrade were selected to participate in the RTA program in the first year of its
implementation. One school did not provide us the list of students so it is excluded from our sample.
Nine schools were selected in 2010. We obtained the list of students and detailed administrative data
from a subsample of four schools. For the remaining five schools we only know the percentage of Roma
per school. Their percentages are comparable to those in our subsample.
15The same holds for the whole sample of schools involved in the program in Serbia. In the RTA
program, the schools selected in the first year are not different from the schools selected later in terms
of their observable characteristics. The same holds for the assistants (Battaglia and Lebedinski, 2015).
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a university degree; in Late Enrollees schools 33 percent.16 Furthermore, school quality
is not different between Early and Late Enrollees schools. Average marks, absences and
dropout rates of previous years in Early Enrollees schools do not suggest they are better
schools (Battaglia and Lebedinski, 2015).17
One concern is that motivation may differ between schools applying before and schools
applying later.18 If these motivations are related to differences in principle or school
quality it might cause a selection bias problem. Our estimates can be overestimated:
parents’ expectations can be correlated with the quality of the school. If children are
going to better schools, parents may reasonably expect better educational attainment
and better labor market prospects for them, unconditional to the program. However,
this concern can be mitigated since school quality is not different between Early Enrollees
and Late Enrollees. Moreover, principal quality should be reflected in assistant quality in
order to affect parents’ expectations but the assistants are not chosen by the principal.
Therefore, we know first that selection criteria remained the same in both years and
the selection committee rated schools in the same way. Second, schools could apply in
both years and those applying before and after do not differ in terms of observable char-
acteristics. Third, the schools selected in both years do not differ in terms of observable
characteristics. Fourth, the quality of the schools selected in both years is not different.
Based on these facts, we argue that the phasing in of the program can be treated as if it
were exogenous.
16Among assistants in Late Enrollees schools there is one missing value for the information on the
maximum level of education. This explains why the categories secondary school and university do not
sum to 1.
17Table B of the Appendix reports the marks, absences and dropout rates of pupils in both Early and
Late Enrollees schools in Belgrade for the year of the introduction of the program and the previous year.
18In both years the program was advertised in the Politika and Prosvetni Pregled newspapers. The
latter newspaper is for people working in the education sector. In 2010/2011 schools’ directorates - one
directorate may be responsible for more than a municipality - were in charge of sending applications
directly to the schools.
11
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use first-hand collected data obtained through a survey conducted with 300 Roma
households in five municipalities of Belgrade.19 The survey took place in Fall 2010,
one year after the implementation of the program in Early Enrollees and before Late
Enrollees schools received the assistant. In 2010 schools received the assistant in Novem-
ber/December.
The households in our sample have children who were enrolled in both types of primary
schools. The pupils interviewed were randomly selected among the students attending
the schools.20 We know that assistants work mainly with pupils in the lower four grades
and we are interested in the effect of the RTA program on this subgroup of children.21
Our sample is constructed in such a way that all households have at least one child in
the lower four grades of primary school in the school year 2009/2010.22
Figure 4 displays a map of Belgrade with the 13 neighbourhoods located in the five
municipalities where the survey was conducted. In settlements 1 to 5, the assistants
began to work in 2009/2010 and they correspond to the settlements with children from
Early Enrollees schools. Settlements 6 to 13 had assistants starting from 2010/2011 (Late
Enrollees). As shown, Early and Late Enrollees are located in different neighbourhoods of
Belgrade, so concerns regarding potential spillovers across schools are not relevant in our
context.23 Potential spillovers between students who are helped or not by the assistant
within Early Enrollees schools cannot be excluded. Parents who live in the same area
also likely interact.24 Nevertheless, if there are spillover effects from children helped by
19The five municipalities are Vozˇdovac, Zvezdara, Zemun, Palilula, and Cˇukarica.
20The response rate was 93.46 percent: 321 households were contacted and 300 answered. Households
were not compensated for their participation.
21In Serbia, primary school is 8 years in duration. In the first four grades pupils get one teacher who
teaches all compulsory subjects except English, while in the upper four years pupils get one teacher per
subject. School is compulsory until the age of 15. Children enroll in primary school if they are aged at
least 6.5 years at the start of the school year in September.
22Our sample includes households which enrolled their children in 2009/2010. Thus, students who
dropout are included in the sample.
23Only one suburban area has an Early and a Late Enroollees school, which are located on opposite
sides of the village.
24In 70 percent of cases the pupils live in different areas of the neighbourhood where the school is
located and among those living on the same street, pupils not helped by the assistant are older and
enrolled in higher grades. They might be less likely to interact, both inside and outside the school, with
pupils who are helped.
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the assistants to children not helped by them, the impacts we observe would be lower
bounds of the actual impact. We would be underestimating the effects of the program.
3.1 First definition: Early Enrollees versus Late Enrollees
Our sample is divided into two groups. The first group consists of 122 households
with children enrolled in the five schools which received a Roma teaching assistant in
2009/2010. These households are randomly selected among households with at least one
child in a Early Enrollees school and correspond to the treated group. The 178 remaining
households were randomly selected from students attending the four schools which im-
plemented the RTA program in 2010/2011 and they are our control group. The number
of households selected from each settlement is proportional to the size of the settlement.
We consider the whole household to be treated if at least one child goes to a school with
an assistant in the first year of the implementation of the program.
Table 2 reports the predetermined characteristics of treated and control groups.
[insert TABLE 2 here]
The treated and control groups are comparable in terms of observable characteristics.
Their differences in means are not statistically significant in almost all cases. Wealth,
monthly income, educational attainments and household composition do not differ be-
tween the groups.25 Households are equally located in rural and urban areas26, and in
only Roma neighborhoods.27 A total of 32 percent of households in the control group
and 31 percent in the treated group have at least one member working in the informal
sector. The only statistically significant difference is found in terms of religion: there are
significantly more Muslim among non-treated households (80 percent versus 57 percent).
25Birth order among siblings is significantly higher among treated households. Nonetheless, we do not
believe this to be problematic given that household composition does not differ between the two groups.
26We define urban area as a local community with more than 35,000 inhabitants, in line with the
definition of the Municipality of the City of Belgrade that distinguishes between urban and suburban
areas in its own territory.
27We asked households whether there were only Roma or both Roma and Non-Roma in their commu-
nity/neighborhood (200 meters around their house). Therefore, the neighborhoods do not correspond
exactly to the 13 settlements where the survey was conducted.
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Therefore, it would be worthy to investigate whether the program impacts differently
depending on the religion (see section A.4 of the Appendix on heterogeneous effects).28
Unfortunately, our study has a limited power and we are aware that significant true
differences might go undetected due to it.29 However, if we were concerned that a possible
unbalance between the two groups may affect the results, it is unlikely that it would lead
to their overestimation. The characteristics of the households whose children are enrolled
in the Early Enrollees schools are associated, if any, with higher labor market prospects
and educational attainment. The small, non-significant differences go in a direction such
that one would expect them to make our estimates lower bounds of the true effects.
In addition to the comparability between treatment and control group, identification
requires the absence of selective sorting into treatment. Schools and assistants were
informed in late June 2009 if they were accepted into the program. Neither the Ministry
of Education nor the schools disseminated the information about the RTA program among
the parents. The program was not publicized on TV or radio. By the end of June, when
the Ministry decided who would participate in the program, parents whose children were
going to enter the first grade in September of that year had already enrolled them in
school. Our data also confirm that Early Enrollees did not attract more Roma students
than Late Enrollees in the first year of the program.30 We can conclude that there is not
selection of children into schools.
28Overall, the characteristics of our sample are in line with official data (LSMS, 2003). Surprisingly,
there are few households where both parents have not completed primary school (7 percent) and in a
relatively large share of households at least one parent has completed secondary school (19 percent).
However, this might be driven simply by the fact that LSMS data are only collected in segregated
settlements that are likely to be poorer.
29With nine clusters and 75 students per school, the minimum detectable effect in our case is 0.35 of
a standard deviation (Spybrook et al., 2011).
30Roma pupils attending Early Enrollees schools in the pretreatment year - 2008/2009 - corresponded
to 2.4 percent of all Roma enrolled in these schools. In Late Enrollees they accounted for 2.1 percent. In
2009/2010 these percentages were 1.6 percent and 1.3 percent, respectively. The number of Roma pupils
enrolling in school for the first time reduced from one year to the other but it did it proportionally in
both types of schools.
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3.2 Second definition: Directly helped versus not directly helped
by the assistant in Early Enrollees schools
Our definition of treated and control group assumes that everyone in a school with an
assistant is aware of her presence. Roma people usually live in communities where they
know each other and regularly interact. They are even in contact with people living
elsewhere belonging to the same community. Family and community ties are strong.
Moreover, all the assistants live and work in the same municipality. It is unlikely that
households do not know that there is a Roma assistant in the school their children are
enrolled in. However, there is only one assistant per school and not every Roma child
in the treated school is helped by her. One can argue then that only parents of children
directly interacting with the assistant are the actual treated group. We can therefore
explore another definition of being treated beside the main one. A household is treated
if at least one child is in an Early Enrollees school and there is evidence from the survey
that the assistant has worked with her. The school cannot keep track of the names of
the children with whom the assistant interacts but we obtain this information from the
parents. In this case we are certain that the treated households are aware of the presence
of the assistant. A household is treated if either (1) parents state that there is someone
in the school who helps the child with her homework or she is having additional classes
at school, or (2) there is someone from the school who has ever come to her place or call
her because of the child. In these cases we know from the parents the name of the person
who is helping their child and we can match it with the name of the assistant.31
Table 3 reports the characteristics of households with treated and not treated children
in Early Enrollees schools.32
[insert TABLE 3 here]
31We decided not to explicitly ask the parents whether their child’s school was in the RTA program
because it was not clear to us whether the parents are aware of the name of the program and how they
perceive the teaching assistant, for instance as assistant or teacher.
32Treated children account for 50 percent of pupils in Early Enrollees schools. This percentage is
slightly higher than what has been reported before - assistants work with one third of Roma students -
because in the survey we selected households with at least one child in the lower four grades of primary
school (not in all eight grades). The rationale is that we know that assistants work mainly, if not
exclusively, with them.
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The differences in means between those helped by the assistant (treated) and those
not helped (untreated) are often not statistically significant. Nonetheless, children helped
by the assistant mainly live in urban areas and have at least one family member working
in the informal sector and less educated parents. There are also more Muslims among
them. Moreover, the assistant works mainly with younger children, as also suggested by
the guidelines of the program.
3.3 Outcome variables
We use three different sets of questions to understand whether the program is effective
in changing parents’ expectations about their children’s future opportunities. We focus
on parents’ expectations because we believe that at such a young age (6 to 15) they
are more relevant for children’s educational attainment and more reliable for expected
returns to education than children’s expectations. However we ask pupils about the
highest expected level of education they expect to achieve (see section B.4. of the Online
Appendix).
The first and second set of questions relates to expected returns to education. Al-
though either the mother or father (or caretaker) are asked these questions, the mother
is the main interviewee in 92 percent of cases. They are asked about the oldest boy and
the oldest girl in the household.33 The first set of questions considers expectations about
the likelihood of getting a job given a certain level of education attained. The second set
of questions elicits minimum and maximum amounts parents expect that their children
will earn once employed. We obtained the minimum and maximum earnings and we use
their (log) average as our measure of expected earnings. The third relevant outcome is
the highest expected educational level of the child. The question is asked for each child
between 6 and 15 years old, so that all the oldest boys and oldest girls are included and
33In the pilot survey we asked the questions for each child but we realized that there was no variation
in the responses between the children of the same sex. As a result, we decided to ask these questions
only with regard to the oldest male and for the oldest female child. In only 6 percent of cases the oldest
child is older than 15 and thus not enrolled in a compulsory school. In this case, respondents were asked
to respond to these questions for the second oldest child.
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possibly their younger siblings as well.34 35 Summary statistics for the outcome vari-
ables in our sample are reported in Table 4 and suggest a possible positive impact of the
program on both expected salary and level of education attained.
[insert TABLE 4 here]
4 Estimation Strategy and Results
4.1 First definition: Early Enrollees versus Late Enrollees
We estimate the impacts of the RTA program on expected returns to education with the
following specification:
Yj = α0 + α1treatmentj + α2X
′
j + εj (1)
where Yj corresponds to the outcomes of interest for the household j : likelihood of
finding a job with primary school as the highest level of education attained, likelihood of
finding a job with secondary school as the highest level of education attained, (log) mean
amount of earnings per month with primary education and (log) mean amount of earnings
per month with secondary education. treatmentj equals 1 if there is at least one child in
the household who goes to an Early Enrollees school. X ′j includes household wealth per
capita, if a member of the family works in the informal sector, if the household lives in a
urban area and in a Roma neighborhood, if the household is Muslim and the maximum
educational level of parents and household composition characteristics. For the outcome
‘secondary school as the highest expected level of education’, we have information for each
child in the household between 6 and 15 years old. We introduce a second specification
where the dependent variable is at the child level:
Yij = β0 + β1treatmentj + β2X
′
ij + νij (2)
34The median number of children aged 6 to 15 per household is 2. There are many missing values for
this outcome of interest. This explains why our sample is as large as with the other outcomes.
35For the sake of consistency we also estimate the impact with a reduced sample, corresponding only
to the case that (name) is the oldest boy or the oldest girl in the household. The results are not reported,
but they are discussed in the footnotes.
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treatmentj is defined as above. X
′
ij also includes age and age squared of the child, the
child’s gender, birth order among siblings, and - in order to control for each child’s abil-
ity - demeaned mark in Mathematics and Serbian of the previous school year.36 Robust
standard errors are clustered at the school level and corrected with Moulton confidence
intervals in case of linear regressions (Imbens and Kolesa´r, 2016). Regressions are es-
timated separately for boys and girls because we are interested in the effects for each
gender.37 We also report the results with the pooled sample in Table C of the Appendix.
The results for the probability of finding a job, expected earnings and highest expected
educational level are reported in Table 5. For purposes of consistency, all the estimates
are OLS, but probit estimates for the two dummy outcomes confirm the results. We
need to bear in mind that the way in which the program is designed constrains us to
nine clusters - the schools involved in the program - and 75 pupils treated per school,
whom are equally distributed between boys and girls. The intra-class correlation with
our outcomes is equal to 0.05 for the sample of boys and 0.10 for the sample of girls. With
a power of 0.8, the minimum detectable effect is 0.5 of a standard deviation (Spybrook
et al., 2011; McConnell and Vera-Hernandez, 2015). Nonetheless, we obtain statistically
significant results with the limited power of 0.4.
[insert TABLE 5 here]
Columns (1) to (4) show estimates for boys, while columns (5) to (8) refer to girls. The
coefficients for the expected probabilities of finding a job with primary and secondary
school as the highest level of education are reported in the top panel of Table 5. The
results are not statistically significant in all specifications. We retain the null hypothesis
that the population mean of the outcome variable in the treatment group will be the
same as in the control group for the probability of finding a job. However, due to the
36The marks are demeaned from the average school marks (among Roma). For children in their first
grade, the average school marks are used.
37It is worth investigating whether the gender of the assistant may affect boys and girls differently for
our outcomes of interest. The results do not suggest that expectations change depending on the sex of
the assistant. This seems to matter only for the likelihood of getting a secondary education level for
girls. Their parents expect them to achieve a higher level of education when the assistant is female than
when he is male. However, the caveat here is that among assistants only one is male.
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limited power of our study, we may have committed a Type II error, that is, the prob-
ability of finding no intervention effect when one actually exists, making these results
virtually impossible to interpret. We cannot claim the program to be ineffective on job
opportunities if there is low power, since low power means that we have little chance of
finding an effect on the mean of the outcome variable when there is a true effect.
The middle part of the table shows the results for the expected (log) mean earnings
per month. Parents in treated households expect higher future wages for both boys and
girls, although the results are statistically significant only at 10 percent. Conditional
on having attained a secondary educational level, being in a treated household increases
the expected monthly earnings by almost 9.4 percent for boys and 10.07 percent for
girls, on average (0.286 and 0.291 of a standard deviation, respectively).38 This increase
corresponds to almost 26 euros (roughly 7 euros more per week) with respect to an average
expected earning in households not involved in the program of 271 euros for boys and
255 euros for girls. Thus, although treated parents may not expect higher employment
perspectives for their children, they do expect higher wages once they obtain a job. This
suggests that they likely expect them to get better jobs.39 Moreover, being in a treated
household increases the expected monthly earnings by almost 11 percent for boys and 13
percent for girls, on average, conditional on having attained a primary educational level
(0.312 and 0.123 of a standard deviation, respectively).
The regression results for secondary education as the highest expected level of ed-
ucation are reported in the bottom part of the table. We find that parents in treated
households are more likely to expect their children to finish secondary school. The impact
is statistically significant only for boys. On average, parents of pupils in Early Enrollees
schools are 12 percentage points more likely to expect their sons to finish secondary school
(0.243 of a standard deviation).40
38The regression coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities. 0.090 corresponds to 100∗ (e0.090−
1); 0.096 corresponds to 100 ∗ (e0.096 − 1). We estimate the effects also with minimum and maximum
earnings. The results are similar.
39The minimum wage in Serbia in 2010 was almost 200 euros (21645 dinars; 1 RSD = 0.009626 euros
as of November 2011). The average wage was around 330 euros (34422 dinars) and in Belgrade it was
around 400 euros, corresponding to 42421 dinars (Serbian Statistical Office, 2010).
40If we consider only the oldest boy and the oldest girl in the household we obtain similar results.
The magnitude of the coefficients is even larger. The coefficient of treatment for boys is statistically
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4.2 Second definition: Directly helped versus not directly helped
by the assistant in Early Enrollees schools
There is only one assistant per school and not every Roma child in the treated school is
helped by her. One can argue that only parents of children directly interacting with the
assistant can be affected by her presence in the school. Our second definition considers a
household to be treated only if at least one child attends an Early Enrollees school and
the assistant has worked with her.
The assistant chooses the pupils she works with: treated children are not randomly
selected. The children receiving the treatment are a selected subset of Early Enrollees
school children. A simple comparison between those actually helped and the control group
(those not helped in Early Enrollees schools and children in Late Enrollees schools) would
be misleading. To address this problem, we use an instrumental variable strategy. By
assumption, here being in a Early Enrollees school is only capturing the intention-to-treat
(ITT) effect: being in a Early Enrollees school - assigned treatment - can be used as an
instrumental variable for being helped by the assistant - treatment received.
We use the following specification:
Y(i)j = θ0 + θ1assistantj + θ2X
′
(i)j + ε(i)j (3)
where Y(i)j corresponds to the outcomes of interest of individual i in household j:
likelihood of finding a job with primary school as the highest level of education attained,
likelihood of finding a job with secondary school as the highest level of education attained,
(log) mean amount of earnings per month with primary education and (log) mean amount
of earnings per month with secondary education and secondary school as the highest
expected level of education. assistantj is equal to 1 when there is at least one child in
the household who is directly helped by the assistant and 0 otherwise. Given the problem
significant at 10 percent.
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of selection bias, we know that the error term ε(i)j is composed here of two parts:
(i)j = η(i)j + u(i)j (4)
where η(i)j is an unobservable individual term and u(i)j is a random term. assistantj
depends on some factors captured by η(i)j. We therefore model assistantj in a reduced
form framework as follows:
assistantj = γ0 + γ1treatmentj + γ2X
′
(i)j + η(i)j + v(i)j (5)
where treatmentj is equal to 1 if there is at least one child in the household enrolled in a
Early Enrollees school. Being enrolled in a Early Enrollees school is correlated with the
fact of being helped by the assistant but uncorrelated with any unobservable attributes
that affect the outcomes of interest. The instrument is as good as randomly assigned.
It also satisfies the exclusion restriction by assumption: only parents of children directly
interacting with the assistant are aware of her presence in the school. The instrument
operates only through the fact of being helped by the assistant (Yi(d, 0) = Yi(d, 1) for
d = 0, 1). The monotonicity assumption needed for heterogeneous IV models holds: while
the instrument may have no effect on some people, all those who are affected, are affected
in the same way. θ1 in (3) captures the local average treatment effect (LATE), which in
this case is the effect of treatment on the treated. There are no always-takers in this case
(those helped by the assistant are only in Early Enrollees schools): the treated population
consists entirely of compliers.
Results for the probability of finding a job, expected earnings and highest expected
educational level are reported in Table 6.41 Columns (1) to (2) show the estimates for
41The use of IV to solve selection bias problems is illustrated in Table D in Appendix. Columns (1)
and (2) report OLS results. These estimates are misleading because they compare pupils according
to the actual treatment received: those helped by the assistant versus those not helped in the same
Early Enrollees schools and children in control schools. Columns 3 and 4 compare pupils according
to whether they are potentially treated: being in a Early Enrollees or Late Enrollees school. This is
the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect. Since treatment was as good as randomly assigned, ITT tells us
the causal effect of being in a Early Enrollees school. It builds in the fact that some pupils in treated
schools are not treated. For this reason, it is smaller than the average casual effect on those actually
treated. It clearly corresponds to our main specification where we assume instead that everyone in a
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boys, while columns (3) to (4) show the estimates for girls.
[insert TABLE 6 here]
The coefficients for the expected probabilities of finding a job with primary and secondary
school as the highest level of education are reported in the top panel. They are similar to
those obtained in the main specification. As before, results are not statistically significant
in all specifications and, due to low power, we cannot claim the program to be ineffective
on job opportunities. The second part of the table shows the results for the expected
(log) mean earnings per month. Parents in treated households expect higher future wages
for both boys and girls, as in the main specification. The impacts are reasonably higher:
in this case we are sure parents know the assistant and their children are actually helped
by her. Conditional on having attained a secondary education level, being in a treated
household increases the expected monthly earnings by almost 21 percent for both boys
and girls, on average.42 This increase corresponds to roughly 55 euros. As before, for boys
this is the case also conditional on having attained a primary educational level: being
in a treated household increases the expected monthly earnings by almost 33 percent43,
on average, corresponding to 89 euros. The regression results for secondary education as
the highest expected level of education are reported in the third part of the table. We
find that parents whose children are helped by the assistant are more likely to expect
their children to finish secondary school. As in the main specification, the impact is
statistically significant only for boys. On average, parents of pupils in Early Enrollees
schools are 26 percentage points more likely to expect their sons to finish secondary
school.44 The bottom part reports the results for the first-stage. The coefficients of being
in a Early Enrolless school are positive, as expected, and highly statistically significant.
The first-stage results for the instrumental variable estimation show that F-statistics on
Early Enrollees school is treated. Columns 5 and 6 measure the effect of treatment on the treated. They
do not consistently differ from OLS estimates because treatment and control groups are not so different
in observable characteristics. We know that there is a problem of selection bias because the assistant
chooses the pupils to work with. Still, her choice seems to be close to a random choice. The selection
bias in this case is negative: those who are helped by the assistant tend to be the worst students.
42They correspond to 0.627 and 0.608 of a standard deviation, respectively.
43It corresponds to 0.821 of a standard deviation.
44It corresponds to 0.531 of a standard deviation.
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the incidence of treatment are clearly above 10.45
4.2.1 Remedial education program and role model
Knowing who is actually helped by the assistant allows us to better understand the possi-
ble mechanisms behind the changes in expectations we observe. The effect of the program
likely passes through the remedial education channel: parents expect their children to
go to school more because they now perform better thanks to the assistant. Moreover,
in the Roma Teaching Assistant program all the assistants are Roma and from the same
social background as the pupils they help. In order to obtain the job they needed to have
invested in education in the first place. They can therefore act as role models for the
children with whom they work. The presence of a person sharing her successful story can
affect children’s and their parents’ expectations about their future. Their accomplish-
ment can shape parents’ and children’s beliefs about what they can achieve and in turn
can affect educational choices.
We first consider the remedial education channel. In our survey we ran quick tests in
the subjects of Mathematics and Serbian. We define Maths score equal to 1 when the
child is able to correctly answer both questions − ‘Please tell me how much is 5+4?’−
and − ‘Please tell me how much is 23+12?’−, and 0 otherwise. We define Serbian score
as equal to 1 when the child is able to read and write. A child is able to read when she
knows how to correctly read the sentence written on a card − ‘Could you please read me
the letters, the word and the sentence on this card?’; Able to read takes the value of 0
when she does not know letters, recognizes only letters or is able to read the words but
cannot read the whole sentence. A child is able to write when she knows to correctly
write a proposed sentence − ‘Please write the following sentence’; Able to write takes the
value of 0 when she does not know how to write at all or she writes the sentence with
mistakes. These abilities are supposed to be acquired in the first year of primary school.
Hence, we do expect children of any grade to be able to answer them. Results for the
LATE are reported in Table 7.
45F-statistics on the incidence of treatment are reported in the bottom line of Table 6. The Cragg-
Donald Wald F-test of weak instruments is equal to 116.297.
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[insert TABLE 7 here]
Pupils who are helped by the assistant perform better than their classmates and
pupils in Late Enrollees schools in both test scores, although the impacts are statistically
significant only for Serbian. On average, boys get 0.56 of a standard deviation more; girls
get 0.66 of a standard deviation more.46 Thanks to the assistant, treated kids learn more
and these impacts are large.
In order to disentangle the two possible mechanisms we have in mind - remedial
education and role model - we select only those pupils who did not answer the Serbian
and the Maths tests correctly.47 If among the worst performers we find that expectations
have increased for those helped by the assistant, we have evidence that the effect of
the program does not occur only through the remedial education channel. They have
been helped by the assistant but they are not learning more at school. Still, the parents
believe that their children’s returns to education will be higher and that they will attain
a secondary level of education. We are aware that parents may misperceive their children
abilities and overestimate them (Dizon-Ross, 2013). We are assuming that this happens
in the same way for treated and untreated households. If, however, we believe that
misperception takes place differently between the two types of households, it is likely
that our estimates are underestimating the effect. Parents with children helped by the
assistant can be more informed of their actual abilities and less likely to overestimate
them than parents who do not interact with the assistant. The results are reported in
Table 8.
[insert TABLE 8 here]
The previous results are confirmed, although caution should be taken in the inter-
pretation of the coefficients given the even smaller sample size. The results suggest a
46We also studied the impact of the program on schooling outcomes in its first year of implementation
in a companion study Battaglia and Lebedinski (2015). In that study we found that the program had
a positive effect. There is evidence that children involved in the RTA program attended school more
regularly and that, on average, marks improved and dropout rates reduced for children in their first
grade. Higher and more systematic impacts are obtained in schools with a lower number of Roma,
especially if female.
47To check the robustness of our findings, we estimate the effects separately by selecting those who
did not answer the Serbian test correctly and those who did not answer the Maths test correctly. The
results do not change.
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positive trend in expectations for the probability of finding a job, although they are still
not statistically significant. Conditional on having attained a certain educational level,
being helped by the assistant may increase the expected monthly earnings, although the
results are not significantly different from 0. Due to the limited power of our study, we
cannot interpret them as the program was ineffective on these outcomes. The coefficients
for the highest expected level of education are higher than in the previous case when the
whole sample is considered. On average, parents of pupils directly interacting with the
assistant are 39.2 percentage points more likely to expect their sons to finish secondary
school.48 Even if their children - who are helped by the assistant - are not learning at
school, parents still believe they will go more to school and have higher returns to edu-
cation, once the children have attained a secondary level of education. There is evidence
that the program changes parents’ expectations not only through the remedial education
channel. The presence of a person from the same social background sharing her successful
story may affect parents’ expectations about their children’s future. Yet, the unfortunate
absence of Non-Roma assistants does not allow us to state the effective relevance of the
role model. In the RTA program, all the assistants are Roma and, given that there is no
variation in whether the assistant is Roma or not, it is hard to draw strong conclusions.
4.3 Dropout rates at the end of primary school
It is not a foregone result that the effects we observe on parents’ expectations necessarily
translate to more years of schooling. Data on persistence in school can help us to better
shed lights on the actual effects of the RTA program. Unfortunately, both types of
schools − Early and Late Enrollees − are treated starting from 2010 and it is impossible
to detect the long-term effects on dropout rates in the absence of a control group. Using
administrative data from the final examination at the end of primary school obtained
from the Ministry of Education (Serbian Ministry of Education, 2016), we can track the
children of our survey from Early and Late Enrollees schools, observe whether they finish
primary school and provide descriptive statistics on the share of pupils who finished
48It corresponds to 0.927 of a standard deviation.
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primary school according to the number of years exposed to the treatment. We can
repeat the same exercise with children who were directly helped by the assistant in Early
Enrollees schools.49
Table 9 shows the share of pupils from our survey who finished primary school ac-
cording to the number of years of treatment, both for all pupils (columns 1 and 2) and for
those pupils who were helped by the assistant (columns 3 and 4). The maximum num-
ber of years of treatment is seven because the program was introduced in the 2009/2010
school year and the available final examination dataset ends in September 2016. The
minimum number of years of treatment is five because the assistants worked primarily
with the lower four grades and started to work in 2009/2010: in 2009/2010 the oldest
treated pupils were in the fourth grade and they finished primary school at the earliest
in 2013/2014.
[insert TABLE 9 here]
We can observe that, in both samples, the share of pupils finishing primary school
is higher if pupils were treated for seven years than if they were treated for fewer years.
Moreover, note also that the assistants worked mainly with low performing students and
even these students were as likely to finish primary school as other students. We cannot
claim there is a causality here: we cannot conclude that the effects on parents’ expec-
tations necessarily translate to more years of schooling. Nonetheless, the information
available suggests that more years of exposure to the RTA program are associated with
a higher probability of at least finishing primary school. This is extremely relevant in a
context where even primary completion rates are usually low.
5 Conclusion
We exploit the gradual implementation of the RTA program to identify its impact on
expectations. Our data, collected one year after the first implementation, suggest that
49It is too early to get any information on secondary education: pupils involved in the program have
not yet reached the age to finish secondary school. They were at most in the fourth grade in 2010 and
therefore they are in 2016 in the first grade of secondary education.
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parents of children involved in the program expect higher returns to education for their
kids. They may not be more likely to expect them to find a job, but once employed they
are expected to earn higher wages. This suggests that they might expect better jobs for
them. On average, being in a treated household increases the expected monthly earnings
by almost 9.4 percent for boys and 10.07 percent for girls. Moreover, on average, parents
of pupils in treated schools are 12.3 percentage points more likely to expect their sons to
finish secondary education than parents of pupils in control schools. However, there is
only one assistant per school and not every Roma child in the treated school is helped by
her. One can argue that only parents of children directly interacting with the assistant
are the actual treated group. Our second definition of treatment considers a household
to be treated only if at least one child is in a treated school and there is evidence from
the survey that the assistant has worked with her. We obtain results similar to the
main specification. The impacts are reasonably higher, although the results are always
weakly statistically significant. The effect of the program occurs through the remedial
education channel, especially for pupils we know are helped by the assistant. Parents
expect their children to go more to school because they now perform better thanks to
the assistant. From our survey we know that those helped by the assistant do better
in test scores. However, if we select the students performing badly, we still find higher
expected returns to education for pupils helped by the assistant. In addition to the
remedial education mechanism, the presence of a person of the same social background
who is successful may motivate parents to believe their children can succeed. We cannot
conclude that the effects on parents’ expectations necessarily translate to more years
of schooling. Nonetheless, administrative data from the final examination at the end
of primary school obtained from the Ministry of Education suggests that more years of
exposure to the RTA program are associated with a higher probability of at least finishing
primary school.
The Roma Teaching Assistant program raises the expectations of the targeted minor-
ity. Roma people may reasonably underestimate the need to invest in education: they
often perceive low benefits of going to school compared to the respective costs and under-
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invest in education. The success of the remedial education mechanism, together with the
provision of a role model, can be effective in increasing households’ current investment
in education. Moreover, remedial education programs that target minorities through the
hiring of minority teachers can help create role models by providing previously unex-
pected opportunities to a group. The unfortunate absence of Non-Roma assistants does
not allow us to state the effective relevance of the role model. Yet, this study suggests
replicable examples in contexts where minorities suffer low attainment rates and social ex-
clusion. One year of a remedial education program may not be enough to break the curse
of low expectations, but encouraging results are found in this direction. Investigating the
effects of such programs in the long-run is a central question for future research.
28
References
Akerlof, G. A. and R. E. Kranton (2000). Economics and Identity. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 115 (3), 715–753.
Battaglia, M. and L. Lebedinski (2015). Equal Access to Education: An Evaluation of
the Roma Teaching Assistant Program in Serbia. World Development 76(C), 62–81.
Brueggemann, C. (2012). Roma Education in Comparative Perspective. Analysis of the
UNDP/World Bank/EC Regional Roma Survey 2011. Roma Inclusion Working Papers,
Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme.
Dee, T. S. (2004). Teachers, Race, and Student Achievement in a Randomized Experi-
ment. The Review of Economics and Statistics 86 (1), 195–210.
Dizon-Ross, R. (2013). Parents’ Perceptions and their Children’s Education: Experimen-
tal Evidence from Malawi. Working Paper .
Glewwe, P. and M. Kremer (2006). Schools, Teachers, and Education Outcomes in De-
veloping Countries, Volume 2 of Handbook of Economics of Education, Chapter 16, pp.
945–1017. Elsevier.
Graham, P. A. (1987). Black Teachers: A Drastically Scarce Resource. Phi Delta Kap-
pan 68 (8), 598–605.
Imbens, G. W. and M. Kolesa´r (2016, October). Robust Standard Errors in Small Sam-
ples: Some Practical Advice. The Review of Economics and Statistics 98 (4), 701–712.
Jensen, R. (2010). The (perceived) Returns to Education and the Demand for Schooling.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 (2), 515–548.
Kaufmann, K. M. and O. Attanasio (2009). Educational Choices, Subjective Expecta-
tions, and Credit Constraints. NBER Working Paper 15087 .
Ladson-Billings, G. (1994). The Dreamkeepers: Successful Teachers of African American
Children. Jossy Bass Publishers.
29
LSMS (2003). Living Standards Measurement Study-Serbia.
Manski, C. (1993). Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem.
Review of Economic Studies 60 (3), 531–542.
McConnell, B. and M. Vera-Hernandez (2015, September). Going Beyond Simple Sample
Size Calculations: a Practitioner’s Guide. IFS Working Papers W15/17, Institute for
Fiscal Studies.
Nguyen, T. (2008). Information, Role Models and Perceived Returns to Education: Ex-
perimental Evidence from Madagascar. Ph. D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology.
Open Society Institute (2007). Equal Access to Quality Education For Roma. Technical
report, Open Society Foundation.
Rosenbaum, P. R. and D. B. Rubin (1985). Constructing a Control Group Using Multi-
variate Matched Sampling Methods that Incorporate the Propensity Score. American
Statistician 39 (1), 33–38.
Serbian Ministry of Education (2016). Zavrsˇni ispit.
Serbian Statistical Office (2010). http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/Default.
aspx.
Spybrook, J., H. Bloom, R. Congdon, C. Hill, A. Martinez, and S. Rauden-
bush (2011). Optimal Design Plus Empirical Evidence: Documentation for
the Optimal Design Software. http://www.wtgrantfoundation.org/resources/
consultation-service-and-optimal-design.
Wilson, W. (1987). The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public
Policy. Sociology, Urban studies, Black studies. University Press.
30
A Tables
Table 1: Characteristics of the schools and assistants (Belgrade)
before the introduction of the RTA program 2009
All Early Late Difference P-value
Enrollees Enrollees (1-2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Characteristics of the schools
Class size 21.55 20.60 22.75 -2.15 [0.505]
No. of Roma per class 4.67 3.80 5.75 -1.95 [0.566]
No. of Roma per class 5.25 4.75 5.75 -1.00 [0.764]
(if at least a Roma)
No. of Roma per school (%) 0.23 0.23 0.24 -0.01 [0.952]
Female
Roma 0.49 0.53 0.47 0.06 [0.209]
Non-Roma 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.01 [0.544]
Born in the same town
Roma 0.77 0.79 0.75 0.04 [0.358]
Non-Roma 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.00 [0.722]
Number of schools 9 5a 4
Number of Roma pupils 581 231 350
Number of Non-Roma pupils 2133 927 1206
Characteristics of the assistants
Female 0.875 0.8 1 -0.2 [0.374]
Maximum level of education
Secondary school 0.5 0.6 0.33 0.27 [0.543]
University 0.375 0.4 0.33 -0.07 [0.877]
Experience with Roma 0.75 1 0.33 0.67 [0.183]
Experience in NGO 1 1 1 0 [.]
Number of assistants 8 5 3b
a Early Enrollees schools are 6. One school did not provide us the list of students so
it is excluded from our sample.
b We could not get information about one assistant in Late Enrollees schools.
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Table 2: Early Enrollees vs. Late Enrollees.
Means of control variables in treated and control households
Variables at the household level All Treatment Control Difference
Wealtha 0.08 -0.14 0.22 -0.36
(0.39)
Monthly Total income (in dinars)b 28949.47 28224.39 29453.33 -1228.94
(2574.97)
Informal (=1)c 0.32 0.31 0.32 -0.01
( 0.05)
Urban (=1) 0.51 0.47 0.53 -0.06
(0.06)
Only Roma in neighborhood (=1)d 0.21 0.28 0.16 0.12
(0.07)
No schooling/Unfinished primary school (=1)e 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00
(0.03)
Finished primary school (=1)e 0.74 0.69 0.76 -0.07
(0.05)
Finished secondary school (=1)e 0.19 0.23 0.16 0.07
(0.05)
Muslim (=1) 0.71 0.57 0.80 -0.23**
(0.10)
Number of children under 5 0.72 0.75 0.70 0.05
(0.10)
Number of female children between 6 and 15 1.65 1.73 1.59 0.14
(0.13)
Number of male children between 6 and 15 1.75 1.80 1.80 0.10
(0.12)
Number of adults 2.44 2.46 2.44 0.02
(0.12)
max no. observations 300 122 178
Variables at the individual level
Children characteristics
Male (=1) 0.52 0.50 0.54 -0.04
(0.04)
Age of child 9.89 10.11 9.74 0.37
(0.28)
Rank among siblings 2.20 2.33 2.11 0.22**
(0.10)
Mark in Mathematicsf 2.77 2.86 2.70 0.16
(0.11)
Mark in Serbianf 2.85 2.94 2.79 0.15
(0.11)
max no. observations 673 280 393
Standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a The wealth index was calculated with principal component analysis. The index ranges between -5.55 and
3.69.
b 28950 dinars corresponds to 279 Euro (1 RSD = 0.009626 Euro, November 2011).
c =1 if at least one household member works in the informal sector.
d =1 if the respondent declared that the household lives in an exclusively Roma neighbourhood.
e It refers to the highest level of education obtained by parents.
f We use demeaned mark in Mathematics and Serbian. The mark is demeaned from the average school mark.
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Table 3: Early Enrollees. Means of control variables
for treated and untreated households
Variables at the household level Treated Untreated Difference
Wealtha -0.38 0.13 -0.51
(0.46)
Total income (in dinars)b 27905 29052 -1147
(3270)
Informal (=1)c 0.39 0.25 0.14*
(0.081)
Urban (=1) 0.66 0.29 0.37***
(0.07)
Only Roma in neighborhood (=1)d 0.35 0.21 0.14
(0.09)
No schooling/unfinished primary school (=1)e 0.11 0.03 0.08
(0.06)
Finished primary school (=1)e 0.63 0.75 -0.12*
(0.07)
Finished secondary school (=1)e 0.25 0.21 0.03
(0.07)
Muslim (=1) 0.68 0.47 0.21**
(0.09)
Number of children under 5 0.87 0.66 0.21
(0.16)
Number of female children between 6 and 18 1.82 1.67 0.15
(0.16)
Number of male children between 6 and 18 1.86 1.75 0.11
(0.18)
Number of adults 2.53 2.38 0.15
(0.17)
max no. observations 65 56
Variables at the individual level
Children characteristics
Male (=1) 0.5 0.5 0
(0.05)
Age of child 9.73 10.44 -0.69**
(0.31)
Rank among siblings 2.34 2.33 0.01
(0.17)
Mark in Mathematicsf 2.91 2.81 0.10
(0.14)
Mark in Serbianf 3.03 2.87 0.16
(0.14)
max no. observations 148 130
Standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at
1%.
a The wealth index was calculated with principal component analysis. The index ranges between
-5.55 and 3.69.
b 28950 dinars corresponds to 279 Euro (1 RSD = 0.009626 Euro, November 2011).
c =1 if at least one household member works in the informal sector.
d =1 if the respondent declared that the household lives in an exclusively Roma neighbourhood.
e It refers to the highest level of education obtained by a household member.
f We use demeaned mark in Mathematics and Serbian. The mark is demeaned from the average
school mark.
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Table 4: Early Enrollees vs. Late Enrollees.
Means of outcome variables in treated and control households
Variables at the household level All Treatment Control Difference
Probability to find a job: Boys
With primary school (=1)a 0.42 0.35 0.48 -0.13**
(0.06)
With secondary school (=1)a 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.00
(0.05)
Probability to find a job: Girls
With primary school (=1)a 0.35 0.31 0.39 -0.08
(0.06)
With secondary school (=1)a 0.79 0.74 0.82 -0.07
(0.05)
max no. observations 296 120 176
Expected mean log earning: Boys
With primary school 9.91b 9.97 9.87 0.10
(0.06)
With secondary school 10.21c 10.24 10.18 0.06∗
(0.19)
Expected mean log earning: Girls
With primary school 9.82d 9.90 9.78 0.12∗
(0.07)
With secondary school 10.14e 10.18 10.11 0.07*
(0.04)
max no. observations 241 97 144
Variables at the individual level
Expected to finish : Boys
Secondary school (=1) 0.61 0.67 0.57 0.10*
(0.06)
Expected to finish : Girls
Secondary school (=1) 0.63 0.67 0.60 0.07
(0.06)
max no. observations 299 120 179
Standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at
1%.
a Respondent expects the child to find a job given a certain level of education achieved.
b The corresponding average earning is 21709 dinars (208 Euro, Nov 2011). For treated house-
holds is 22985 dinars (221 Euro, Nov 2011); for control households is 21075 dinars (202 Euro,
Nov 2011).
c The corresponding average earning is 28654 dinars (276 Euro, Nov 2011). For treated house-
holds is 29398 dinars (283 Euro, Nov 2011); for control households is 28141 dinars (271 Euro,
Nov 2011).
d The corresponding average earning is 19432 dinars (187 Euro, Nov 2011). For treated house-
holds is 20915 dinars (201 Euro, Nov 2011); for control households is 18682 dinars (180 Euro,
Nov 2011).
e The corresponding average earning is 26923 dinars (259 Euro, Nov 2011). For treated house-
holds is 27529 dinars (265 Euro, Nov 2011); for control households is 26527 dinars (255 Euro,
Nov 2011).
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Table 5: Early Enrollees vs. Late Enrollees.
All outcomes by education level and by gender
Gender Boys Girls
Max. level of education Primary school Secondary School Primary school Secondary school
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probability to find a job with primary/secondary school
treatment -0.109 -0.069 0.010 0.016 -0.067 -0.111 -0.060 -0.032
(0.077) (0.078) (0.058) (0.065) (0.078) (0.074) (0.054) (0.055)
controlsa no yes no yes no yes no yes
No. observations 300 279 300 279 296 271 294 270
R-squared 0.012 0.138 0.000 0.071 0.005 0.118 0.005 0.122
Expected log earnings with primary/secondary school
treatment 0.128 0.108∗ 0.077 0.090∗ 0.149∗ 0.123* 0.075 0.096∗
(0.078) (0.072) (0.056) (0.048) (0.078) (0.071) (0.064) (0.055)
controlsa no yes no yes no yes no yes
No. observations 129 120 247 226 105 98 233 218
R-squared 0.031 0.201 0.017 0.122 0.050 0.241 0.015 0.147
Secondary school as the highest expected level of education
treatment 0.097 0.120∗ 0.067 0.003
(0.097) (0.069) (0.139) (0.172)
controlsb no yes no yes
No. observations 299 232 275 221
R-squared 0.009 0.346 0.005 0.230
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level with Moulton confidence intervals in parentheses:
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a Control variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighborhood, finished primary
school (=1), finished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5, number of female children
between 6 and 15, number of male children between 6 and 15 and number of adults.
b Control variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighborhood, finished primary
school (=1), finished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5, number of female children
between 6 and 15, number of male children between 6 and 15 and number of adults, age of child, age of child squared,
rank among siblings, demeaned mark in Mathematics and demeaned mark in Serbian.
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Table 6: Helped by the assistant.
All outcomes by education level and by gender
Gender Boys Girls
Max. level of education Primary school Secondary School Primary school Secondary school
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probability to find a job with primary/secondary school
assistant -0.135 0.032 -0.224 -0.061
(0.149) (0.111) (0.152) (0.103)
controlsa yes yes yes yes
No. observations 276 276 268 267
R-squared 0.143 0.070 0.113 0.120
Expected log earnings with primary/secondary school
assistant 0.285∗ 0.190∗ 0.284 0.194∗
(0.165) (0.109) (0.189) (0.116)
controlsa yes yes yes yes
No. observations 119 224 98 216
R-squared 0.162 0.047 0.217 0.094
Secondary school as the highest expected level of education
assistant 0.260∗ 0.007
(0.136) (0.176)
controlsb yes yes
No. observations 232 221
R-squared 0.340 0.231
First stage - Being helped by the assistant
treatment 0.472*** 0.465***
(0.058) (0.073)
controlsc yes yes
No. observations 232 221
R-squared 0.464 0.446
F-statistic on treatment 84.14 47.21
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant
at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a Control variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighborhood, finished primary
school (=1), finished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5, number of female children
between 6 and 15, number of male children between 6 and 15 and number of adults.
b Control variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighborhood, finished primary
school (=1), finished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5, number of female children
between 6 and 15, number of male children between 6 and 15 and number of adults, age of child, age of child
squared, rank among siblings, demeaned mark in Mathematics and demeaned mark in Serbian.
c The coefficients are estimated both with the controls used with the first two outcomes and with the third one. The
estimates reported are obtained by using the outcome ”secondary school as the highest expected level of education”.
Therefore, here control variables include wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighborhood, finished
primary school (=1), finished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5, number of female
children between 6 and 15, number of male children between 6 and 15 and number of adults, age of child, age of
child squared, rank among siblings, demeaned mark in Mathematics and demeaned mark in Serbian.
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Table 7: Helped by the assistant.
Test scores by gender
Maths score Serbian score Able to read Able to write
Gender Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
assistant 0.133 0.085 0.280∗ 0.304∗ 0.187 0.107 0.170 0.100
(0.149) (0.158) (0.154) (0.159) (0.147) (0.161) (0.138) (0.124)
controlsa yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. observations 189 153 185 153 189 155 184 154
R-squared 0.210 0.186 0.172 0.046 0.136 0.106 0.228 0.131
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level in parentheses: * significant at 10%,
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a Control variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighborhood, finished
primary school (=1), finished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5, number
of female children between 6 and 15, number of male children between 6 and 15 and number of adults,
age of child, age of child squared, rank among siblings, demeaned mark in Mathematics and demeaned
mark in Serbian.
Table 8: Helped by the assistant. Worst performers.
All outcomes by education level and by gender
Gender Boys Girls
Max. level of education Primary school Secondary School Primary school Secondary school
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probability to find a job with primary/secondary school
assistant -0.259 -0.025 -0.156 0.026
(0.177) (0.151) (0.215) (0.138)
controlsa yes yes yes yes
No. observations 151 151 145 145
R-squared 0.164 0.158 0.074 0.234
Expected log earnings with primary/secondary school
assistant 0.580 0.146 0.321 0.084
(0.438) (0.160) (0.270) (0.155)
controlsa yes yes yes yes
No. observations 77 121 60 118
R-squared 0.303 0.106 0.249 0.107
Secondary school as the highest expected level of education
assistant 0.392** 0.022
(0.180) (0.233)
controlsb yes yes
No. observations 128 117
R-squared 0.372 0.269
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant
at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a Control variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighborhood, finished primary
school (=1), finished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5, number of female children
between 6 and 15, number of male children between 6 and 15 and number of adults.
b Control variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighborhood, finished primary
school (=1), finished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5, number of female children
between 6 and 15, number of male children between 6 and 15 and number of adults, age of child, age of child
squared, rank among siblings, demeaned mark in Mathematics and demeaned mark in Serbian.
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Table 9: Share of pupils in our survey who finished primary school
by number of years of treatment
All pupils Pupils helped by the assistant
Early and Late Enrollees Early Enrollees
Percentage No. observations Percentage No. observations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Seven years of treatment 37.78 45 40.00 20
Six years of treatment 28.04 107 25.93 27
Five years of treatment 31.51 73 25.00 16
Source: data from the final examination at the end of primary school (Serbian Ministry of Education).
B Figures
Figure 1: Comparison of wages by level of education (in dinars)
for Roma and Non-Roma (Belgrade)
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Figure 2: Job characteristics by education levels - Roma people (LSMS, 2003)
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Figure 3: Comparison of real and expected returns to education (our sample)
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Figure 4: Neighbourhoods of the survey
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A Appendix
A.1 School characteristics
Table A: Characteristics of the schools and assistants (Belgrade)
the year before the introduction of the RTA program - 2008
All Early Late Difference P-value
Enrollees Enrollees (1-2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Characteristics of the schools
Class size 22.22 20.00 25.00 -5.00 [0.147]
No. of Roma per class 4.67 3.60 6.00 -2.40 [0.493]
No. of Roma per class 4.67 3.60 6.00 -2.40 [0.493]
(if at least a Roma)
No. of Roma per school (%) 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.01 [0.968]
Female
Roma 0.48 0.52 0.45 0.07 [0.109]
Non-Roma 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.03 [0.289]
Born in the same town
Roma 0.77 0.79 0.76 0.03 [0.353]
Non-Roma 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.02 [0.278]
Number of schools 9 5a 4
Number of Roma pupils 567 238 329
Number of Non-Roma pupils 2199 975 1224
a Early Enrollees schools are 6. One school did not provide us the list of students
so it is excluded from our sample.
Table B: Marks, absences and dropouts in previous years
All Early Late Difference P-value
Enrollees Enrollees (1-2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year of the introduction of the RTA program - 2009
Marks in Mathematics 3.85 3.90 3.81 0.09 [0.495]
Marks in Serbian 3.99 4.05 3.95 0.10 [0.369]
Absences 58.49 60.02 57.34 2.68 [0.673]
Dropout 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 [0.577]
Number of schools 9 5a 4
N0. observations 2693 1153 1540
Previous year - 2008
Marks in Mathematics 3.80 3.82 3.78 0.45 [0.705]
Marks in Serbian 3.94 3.95 3.94 0.01 [0.956]
Absences 60.88 68.72 55.05 13.67 [0.143]
Dropout 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 [0.560]
Number of schools 9 5a 4
No. observations 2638 1123 1515
a Early Enrollees schools are 6. One school did not provide us the list of
students so it is excluded from our sample.
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A.2 First definition: Early Enrollees versus Late Enrollees
Table C: Early Enrollees vs. Late Enrollees.
Pooled sample: all outcomes by education level
Max. level of education Primary school Secondary school
(1) (2)
Probability to find a job with primary/secondary school
treatment -0.112 -0.046
(0.094) (0.111)
treatment*male 0.037 0.050
(0.107) (0.114)
controlsa yes yes
Total Effect -0.074 0.003
(0.111) (0.143)
No. observations 534 533
R-squared 0.135 0.095
Expected log earnings with primary/secondary school
treatment 0.109 0.096
(0.107) (0.119)
treatment*male -0.029 -0.011
(0.123) (0.114)
controlsa yes yes
Total Effect 0.079 0.085
(0.525) (0.308)
No. observations 209 431
R-squared 0.223 0.139
Secondary school as the highest expected level of education
treatment -0.001
(0.111)
treatment*male 0.123
(0.115)
controlsb yes
Total Effect 0.122*
(0.074)
No. observations 454
R-squared 0.286
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level with
Moulton confidence intervals in parentheses: * significant at 10%, **
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a Control variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only
Roma in neighborhood, finished primary school (=1), finished sec-
ondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5, number
of female children between 6 and 15, number of male children between
6 and 15 and number of adults.
b Control variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only
Roma in neighborhood, finished primary school (=1), finished sec-
ondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5, number
of female children between 6 and 15, number of male children between
6 and 15 and number of adults, age of child, age of child squared, rank
among siblings, demeaned mark in Mathematics and demeaned mark
in Serbian.
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A.3 Second definition: Directly helped versus not directly helped
by the assistant in Early Enrollees schools
Table D: Early Enrollees vs. Late Enrollees.
OLS and IV estimates: all outcomes by gender
OLS ITT IV
Gender Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability to find a job with primary/secondary school
Primary school -0.129* -0.135* -0.069 -0.116 -0.135 -0.224
(0.076) (0.081) (0.078) (0.065) (0.149) (0.152)
Secondary school 0.003 -0.031 0.016 -0.032 0.032 -0.061
(0.084) (0.076) (0.065) (0.055) (0.111) (0.103)
controlsa yes yes yes yes yes yes
Expected log earnings with primary/secondary school
Primary school 0.097 0.148 0.108* 0.123* 0.285* 0.284
(0.100) (0.095) (0.072) (0.071) (0.165) (0.189)
Secondary school -0.005 0.041 0.090* 0.096* 0.190* 0.194*
(0.057) (0.059) (0.048) (0.055) (0.109) (0.116)
controlsa yes yes yes yes yes yes
Secondary school as the highest expected level of education
Secondary school 0.152* 0.138 0.120* 0.003 0.260* 0.007
(0.082) (0.148) (0.069) (0.172) (0.136) (0.176)
controlsb yes yes yes yes yes yes
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level with Moulton con-
fidence intervals in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** signif-
icant at 1%. The maximum number of observations with primary school is 276 for
boys and 268 for girls; with secondary school is 276 for boys and 267 for girls.
a Control variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neigh-
borhood, finished primary school (=1), finished secondary school (=1), number of chil-
dren under 5, number of female children between 6 and 15, number of male children
between 6 and 15 and number of adults.
b Control variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neigh-
borhood, finished primary school (=1), finished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1),
number of children under 5, number of female children between 6 and 15, number
of male children between 6 and 15 and number of adults, age of child, age of child
squared, rank among siblings, demeaned mark in Mathematics and demeaned mark
in Serbian.
42
A.4 Heterogeneous effects
A.4.1 Muslim households versus Non-Muslim households
Our main specification (1 and 2) is suggestive of the fact that there could be a differen-
tial effect of the program on Muslim households: parents from Muslim households expect
higher earnings conditional on finishing secondary school and they expect their children
to attain a lower level of education for both genders when compared to Non-Muslim
households.50 Moreover, the descriptive statistics (see Table 2) show that the treated
and control groups differ in terms of the number of Muslim households: there are signif-
icantly more Muslim families among households with children enrolled in Late Enrollees
schools. We think it would be worthy to investigate whether the program affects Muslims
differently.
We proceed with the following specification (6) which includes the interaction of being
in a Muslim household and in a treated household:51
Y(i)j = δ0 + δ1treatmentj + δ2muslimj + δ3treatmentj ∗muslimj + δ4X ′(i)j + j (6)
The outcomes, Y(i)j, are the same as in previous estimations. The coefficient δ1 cap-
tures the effect of treatment on Non-Muslim households. The coefficient δ2 captures the
difference between Muslims and Non-Muslims among the Late Enrollees, and δ3 is the
differential impact of interest. Our results are reported in Table E.
The estimates reported in Table E suggest that the program does not impact Mus-
lims and Non-Muslims differently in terms of job market prospects and expected wages.
Nonetheless, Non-Muslim households who attend Early Enrollees schools are, on aver-
age, 21.4 percentage points more likely to expect their sons to finish secondary education
compared to Non-Muslim households in control schools. We do not know the religion of
the assistants in order to investigate further.
50Results are not reported because we decided not to show the coefficients of control variables in any
specification, but they are available upon request.
51In this specification X(i)j does not include if the household is Muslim.
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Table E: Early Enrollees vs. Late Enrollees.
Heterogeneous effects: all outcomes for secondary school by gender
Gender Boys Girls
Max. level of education Secondary School
(1) (2)
Probability to find a job with secondary school
treatment -0.026 -0.038
(0.111) (0.097)
muslim -0.010 0.020
(0.091) (0.085)
treatment*muslim 0.064 0.009
(0.134) (0.118)
controlsa yes yes
No. observations 279 270
R-squared 0.144 0.135
Expected log earnings with secondary school
treatment 0.009 -0.007
(0.082) (0.095)
muslim 0.077 0.067
(0.069) (0.081)
treatment*muslim 0.125 0.157
(0.100) (0.113)
controlsa yes yes
No. observations 226 218
R-squared 0.131 0.158
Secondary school as the highest expected level of education
treatment 0.214** 0.175
(0.116) (0.311)
muslim -0.131 -0.097
(0.100) (0.239)
treatment*muslim -0.149 -0.244
(0.145) (0.336)
controlsb yes yes
No. observations 233 221
R-squared 0.350 0.236
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level with
Moulton confidence intervals in parentheses: * significant at 10%, **
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a Control variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1),
only Roma in neighborhood, finished primary school (=1), finished
secondary school (=1), number of children under 5, number of female
children between 6 and 15, number of male children between 6 and
15 and number of adults.
b Control variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1),
only Roma in neighborhood, finished primary school (=1), finished
secondary school (=1), number of children under 5, number of female
children between 6 and 15, number of male children between 6 and
15 and number of adults, age of child, age of child squared, rank
among siblings, demeaned mark in Mathematics and demeaned mark
in Serbian.
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A.4.2 Young versus old kids
Parents of younger children aged 6 to 10 may respond differently to the program than
parents of older children aged 11 to 15. There are two reasons to expect this to be the
case. First, assistants were explicitly asked to work more with younger children. Second,
we know that the gap in knowledge between Roma and Non-Roma pupils is already
present when children enroll in primary school and that it increases over time. Under
such circumstances, it might be easier to influence parents’ expectations for younger
children than for the older ones.
We estimate the following regression by gender. We have individual outcomes only
for the expected educational level and we only estimate this outcome.
Yij = ϑ0 + ϑ1treatmentj + ϑ2youngij + ϑ3treatmentj ∗ youngij + ϑ4X ′ij + τij (7)
young is equal to 1 if the child is aged 6 to 10 and equal to 0 if she is aged 11 to 15. The
results are shown in Table F.
Our coefficients are not statistically significant when we compare boys in Early En-
rollees and Late Enrollees schools, although the magnitude and direction are still sugges-
tive of the effect. We find that there is little difference between younger and older boys.
The program affects the probability to finish secondary school similarly for both groups,
although the effect is slightly higher for younger children. We find a different effect for
girls instead. Young girls in Early Enrollees schools are on average 27.9 percentage points
more likely to be expected to finish secondary school than older female schoolmates.
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Table F: Early Enrollees vs. Late Enrollees.
Heterogeneous effects by gender (Young vs. Old)
Gender Boys Girls
(1) (2)
Secondary school as the highest expected level of education
treatment 0.091 -0.159
(0.102) (0.166)
young 0.071 -0.378**
(0.106) (0.157)
treatment*young 0.055 0.279*
(0.137) (0.167)
controlsa yes yes
No. observations 233 221
R-squared 0.348 0.264
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level with
Moulton confidence intervals in parentheses: * significant at 10%, **
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
a Control variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1),
only Roma in neighborhood, finished primary school (=1), finished
secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5,
number of female children between 6 and 15, number of male children
between 6 and 15 and number of adults, age of child, age of child
squared, rank among siblings, demeaned mark in Mathematics and
demeaned mark in Serbian.
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B Online Appendix
B.1 Official data on Roma
Roma people are the largest ethnic minority in Europe.52 They are poorer than other
population groups and more likely to fall into poverty and remain poor. They have been
experiencing discrimination for centuries in all the countries where they live. Specifically,
Roma suffer severe social exclusion in terms of overrepresentation among low skilled jobs
and lack of participation in political and cultural life, which has persisted over time.
Official data on Roma in Serbia are scarce and inaccurate.53 Roma people often do not
declare themselves as belonging to the Roma minority in surveys. Most of them consider
themselves both Roma and Serbian and the question of nationality allows only one an-
swer.54 Thus, the 2011 Census counts 147,604 Roma, corresponding to 2.05 percent of the
total Serbian population, while estimates suggest a number between 350,000 and 500,000,
approximately 4-6 percent of the overall population (Open Society Institute, 2007).55 The
Living Standard Measurement Study (LSMS) of 2003 provides rich information on the
living conditions of the Roma population in the country. It is important to note that this
survey includes only Roma living in segregated settlements, which according to the 2002
Census is the case for 83 percent of the Roma population. The numbers from the LSMS
are alarming. Two out of three Roma households are poor: their average consumption
is below the absolute poverty line.56 Almost half of the Roma population (40 percent) is
under the age of 1857 and only 71 percent of children from Roma settlements aged 6 to
52The Roma people are mainly located in South Eastern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech republic, Hungary, Kosovo, Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.
53This is the case for most Central and Eastern European countries where the majority of the Roma
population lives.
54The most appropriate approach when asking for one’s identity would be to allow for multiple iden-
tities, but this approach is rather uncommon in this type of surveys.
55In Belgrade, the 2011 Census counted 27,325 Roma. Estimates of the number of Roma in the city
are not available, but based on the estimates of Open Society Institute (2007) they are roughly 80,000.
56The percentage of the extremely poor among the Roma interviewed in LSMS is 11.9 percent. Those
who are considered extremely poor are those who cannot satisfy even their basic food needs.
57The average age of Roma people is 25, whereas the average age in Serbia is 42. The average number
of children younger than 18 years old is 2.4 per Roma households, while the population average is only
0.9. The average household size of Roma population is of 4.5 household members, while the national
average is 3.2.
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15 attend school. Among the adults, 25 percent have no schooling at all and another 36
percent have not finished primary school.58 Conversely, 99 percent of Non-Roma aged 6
to 15 are enrolled in school and only 13 percent of adults have not completed primary
school. The employment rate among Roma men is very similar to that of the Non-Roma
population (69 percent), but the female employment rate is very low with 34 percent
versus 53 percent. The LSMS confirms that Roma live in difficult conditions and that
they constitute a marginalized minority.
Data on education and job market are in line with those of other European countries.
They underinvest in education due to credit constraints and the existence of barriers of
access to education. Roma people often lack the required ID and face financial constraints.
On average, costs associated with schooling (books and other school material) in Serbia
correspond to almost 2 percent of yearly household income (LSMS 2003). In our sample
of Roma people, they correspond to almost 6 percent of yearly household income.59 Some
children face difficulties at school due to language barriers, they are engaged in child labor
and suffer discrimination from teachers and pupils.60
B.2 Likert scale
We use three different sets of questions to understand whether the program is effective in
changing parents’ expectations about their children’s future opportunities. The first set
of questions considers expectations about the likelihood of getting a job given a certain
level of education attained. We ask: ‘Assume that your oldest boy has finished primary
(or secondary) school - and that is his highest degree - and he is 25-30 years old: how
58In Serbia, school is compulsory until the age of 15. Children enroll in primary school if they are aged
at least 6.5 years at the start of the school year in September. Since 2007, it is compulsory to attend a
free preschool program for at least 6 months. In 2010, compulsory preschool was extended to 9 months.
Primary school is 8 years in duration. In the first four grades pupils get one teacher who teaches all
compulsory subjects except English, while in the upper four years pupils get one teacher per subject.
59For 10 percent of Roma these costs even ranged from 12 percent to 25 percent of yearly household
income.
60Some children have a limited knowledge of Serbian: in the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey con-
ducted by UNICEF in 2006, only 10 percent of Roma declare Serbian to be their mother tongue. More-
over, Roma pupils may face discrimination from teachers and other pupils in schools: they are often
seated in the last row, teachers do not read their homework and do not encourage them to study. More-
over, they are frequently sent to special schools, which has consequences for their future employment
opportunities.
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certain are you that he will get any kind of job?’. We ask the same question for the oldest
girl. The responses are measured on a five-point Likert scale and are ‘Absolutely sure’,
‘Quite sure’, ‘Maybe’, ‘Unlikely’ and ‘No, s/he will not find a job’. For the purpose of our
analysis, we converted the five-point Likert scale outcomes into a dummy variable. If the
respondent declares that it is unlikely or that her child will not find a job given a certain
educational level, we set the probability to zero. In the other three cases − ‘Absolutely
sure’, ‘Quite sure’, ‘Maybe’ − we set the probability to one. An ordered logit analysis
suggests that some categories may not be collapsed. For instance, while for secondary
school ‘Absolutely sure’ and ‘Quite sure’ can be clearly collapsed (cut 1 ), this should not
be in the case for primary school.
Table G: Early Enrollees vs. Late Enrollees.
Ordered Logit - thresholds among categories
Boys Girls
Primary Secondary Primary Secondary
(1) (2) (3) (4)
treatment 0.089 -0.422 0.166 0.083
(0.309) (0.372) (0.390) (0.349)
controls yes yes yes yes
cut1
constant -2.974*** -0.914 -3.457*** -0.338
(0.661) (0.704) (0.720) (0.864)
cut2
constant -1.535*** 0.809 -1.573** 1.876**
(0.611) (0.691) (0.684) (0.871)
cut3
constant -0.131 2.131*** 0.059 3.234***
(0.580) (0.721) (0.659) (0.874)
cut4
constant 1.563** 4.195*** 1.647** 5.669***
(0.616) (0.888) (0.674) (1.032)
No. observations 276 276 268 267
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level in
parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
The second set of questions elicits the minimum and maximum amounts parents
expect that their children will earn once employed. We asked: ‘Assume that your oldest
boy has finished primary school (or secondary) and this is his highest degree and he is
25-30 years old. Think about the kinds of jobs he might be doing in this case. What do
you think is the minimum amount he can earn per month? And the maximum amount?’
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The interviewees were explicitly asked to take into account both regular and irregular
types of income. The same questions were asked for girls. We obtained the minimum and
maximum earnings and we use their (log) average as our measure of expected earnings.61
The third relevant outcome is the highest expected educational level of the child.
The exact question was: ‘What level of formal education do you think that (name) will
complete?’ We create the dummy ‘(at most) secondary as the highest level of education’
that takes the value of 1 when the response was ‘secondary (or more)’ and 0 otherwise.
The question is asked for each child between 6 and 15 years old.62
B.3 First definition: Early Enrollees versus Late Enrollees
We also employ a propensity score matching method in order to check the robustness of
our results obtained with the first specification. We first perform a standard t-test for the
equality of means of the covariates to determine whether significant differences (between
the treated and control group) remain after matching on the propensity score. We also
show the percentage reduction in the standardized bias (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985).
Table H shows that our matching routine has been effective in balancing the covariates.
Table I suggests that our previous results are robust to using a counterfactual group that
is as similar to the treated group as possible.63 In Table J we report the results of the
Rosenbaum sensitivity test for the Wilcoxon signed rank p-value in order to test for the
sensitivity of our results to hidden bias. For boys, the test for expected log earnings
(with secondary educational level) suggests that even a small unobserved difference in a
covariate would change our inference. Conversely, the estimate for the highest expected
level of education is much more robust as it requires a Γ value of 1.6 to obtain a p-value
above the usual 0.05 threshold. For girls, the estimates are more sensitive to possible
hidden bias due to an unobserved confounder.
61When the questions referred to a son, 3 percent of households did not answer, while this percentage
was around 15 percent for a daughter.
62For the purpose of consistency, we also estimate the impact with a reduced sample, corresponding
only to the case (name) is the oldest boy or the oldest girl in the household.
63We use the nearest-neighbour method with replacement.
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Table H: Propensity score matching - Early Enrollees vs Late Enrollees
Mean % Reduction t-test
Variable Treated Control %Bias Bias t p> |t|
Wealth .50098 .44935 2.5 52.8 0.17 0.862
Informal .2716 .30864 -8.0 -31.6 -0.52 0.606
Urban .4321 .44444 -2.5 91.6 -0.16 0.875
Only Roma in neighborhood .17284 .09877 20.1 -113.9 1.38 0.171
No schooling/Unfinished primary school 0 .01235 -20.1 -63.0 -1.00 0.319
Finished primary school .65432 .7037 -11.1 59.3 -0.67 0.504
Finished secondary school .2716 .25926 3.1 89.5 0.18 0.860
Muslim .50617 .46914 8.3 88.4 0.47 0.640
Number of children under 5 .75309 .7037 6.1 66.9 0.39 0.700
Number of female children between 6 and 15 1.6173 1.9012 -24.5 -208.7 -1.39 0.166
Number of male children between 6 and 15 1.6173 1.6914 -7.5 -63.0 -0.47 0.636
Number of adults 2.4321 2.4568 -2.5 69.2 -0.14 0.890
Table I: Propensity Score Matching
Early Enrollees vs. Late Enrollees.
All outcomes for secondary school and by gender
Max. level of education Secondary school
Dependent Variable Probability to find a joba Expected log earningsa Expected education levelb
Gender Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treatment -0.025 0.000 0.071 0.099 0.250* 0.141
(0.035) (0.000) (0.058) (0.072) (0.104) (0.140)
controlsa yes yes yes yes yes yes
No. observations 276 267 224 216 232 221
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,
*** significant at 1%.
a Control variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighborhood, finished primary school
(=1), finished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5, number of female children between 6
and 15, number of male children between 6 and 15 and number of adults.
b Control variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighborhood, finished primary school
(=1), finished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5, number of female children between 6
and 15, number of male children between 6 and 15 and number of adults, age of child, age of child squared, rank among
siblings, demeaned mark in Mathematics and demeaned mark in Serbian.
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Table J: Sensitivity analysis for one side significance level.
Rosenbaum Sensitivity Test for Wilcoxon Signed Rank P-Value
Gender Boys Girls
Γ Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound
P-Value P-Value P-Value P-Value
Expected log earnings
1 0.0285 0.0285 0.0102 0.0102
1.1 0.0112 0.0636 0.0035 0.0256
1.2 0.0042 0.1183 0.0118 0.0529
1.3 0.0015 0.1918 0.0038 0.0945
1.4 0.0005 0.2798 0.0001 0.1505
1.5 0.0002 0.3759 0.00003 0.2189
2 6.7e-07 0.7874 9.1e-08 0.6165
Highest expected education level
1 0.0002 0.0002 0.0849 0.0849
1.1 0.0004 0.0034 0.0458 0.1442
1.2 0.0001 0.0077 0.0240 0.2178
1.3 0.00004 0.0151 0.0123 0.3010
1.4 0.00001 0.0264 0.0062 0.3884
1.5 4.7e-06 0.0424 0.0031 0.4752
1.6 1.5e-06 0.0636 0.0015 0.5575
1.7 4.7e-07 0.0899 0.0007 0.6328
1.8 1.5e-07 0.1213 0.0003 0.6995
1.9 4.7e-08 0.1572 0.0002 0.7571
2 1.5e-08 0.1969 0.0001 0.8058
Gamma is log odds of differential assignment to treatment due to unobserved
factors.
B.4 Pupils’ expectations
Pupils’ expectations at such a young age (6 to 15) are less reliable than their parents’
and less informative of the actual investment in education. At that age it is more likely
that parents decide whether to send their children to school rather than the children
themselves. Nonetheless, we asked children of primary school-age about the highest level
of education they expect to achieve. This allows us to compare parents’ expectations and
their children’s at least for one outcome of interest. The results are reported in Table K.
Pupils’ expected likelihood of attaining a secondary education level is in line with that
of their parents. The results are not statistically significant either when we compare Early
Enrollees and Late Enrollees schools or pupils actually treated and their schoolmates.
However, the direction of the coefficients reflects parents’ expectations.
Table L reports the means of the control variables in households where parents agree
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Table K: Pupils’ expectations
Early Enrollees vs. Late Enrollees. Helped by the assistant.
Gender Boys Girls
(1) (2)
Secondary school as the highest expected level of education
treatment 0.010 -0.039
(0.027) (0.057)
controlsa yes yes
No. observations 135 126
R-squared 0.148 0.143
assistant 0.021 -0.076
(0.053) (0.105)
controlsa yes yes
No. observations 135 126
R-squared 0.148 0.109
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level in
parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant
at 1%.
a Control variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1),
only Roma in neighborhood, finished primary school (=1), finished
secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5,
number of female children between 6 and 15, number of male children
between 6 and 15 and number of adults, age of child, age of child
squared, rank among siblings, demeaned mark in Mathematics and
demeaned mark in Serbian.
or disagree with their children about their expectations regarding the completion of sec-
ondary school. Two-thirds of parents responded in the same manner as their children,
whereas one-third expected their children to attain a lower education level than the level
expected by their children. In only a few cases parents expect more than their children
and this happens mainly when children perform well at school. The discrepancy between
the parents and children’s responses is mainly found among poorer and larger families,
living in only Roma neighborhoods, Muslim and with lower levels of education. These
pupils also perform worse at school than their classmates.
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Table L: Means of control variables in households where parents agree or disagree with
their kids about expected completed secondary school
Variables at the household level Agree Disagree Difference
Wealtha 0.61 -0.63 1.24***
(0.32)
Total income (in dinars)b 32101 25156 6945**
(2530.15)
Informal (=1)c 0.26 0.4 -0.14*
(0.07)
Urban (=1) 0.51 0.55 -0.04
(0.07)
Only Roma in neighborhood (=1)d 0.16 0.29 -0.13**
(0.06)
No schooling/unfinished primary school (=1)e 0.04 0.07 -0.03
(0.03)
Finished primary school (=1)e 0.73 0.81 -0.08
(0.06)
Finished secondary school (=1)e 0.22 0.11 0.11**
(0.05)
Muslim (=1) 0.6 0.87 -0.27***
(0.06)
Number of children under 5 0.64 0.74 -0.10
(0.08)
Number of female children between 6 and 18 1.56 1.87 -0.31*
(0.16)
Number of male children between 6 and 18 1.58 2 -0.42**
(0.14)
Number of adults 2.42 2.59 -0.17
(0.14)
max no. observations 164 79
Variables at the individual level
Children characteristics
Male (=1) 0.53 0.54 -0.01
(0.06)
Age of child 9.67 9.7 -0.03
(0.19)
Rank among siblings 2.03 2.3 -0.27**
(0.13)
Mark in Mathematicsf 3.12 2.53 0.59***
(0.15)
Mark in Serbianf 3.15 2.68 0.47**
(0.14)
max no. observations 217 101
Standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant
at 1%.
a The wealth index was calculated with principal component analysis. The index ranges
between -5.55 and 3.69.
b 28950 dinars corresponds to 279 Euro (1 RSD = 0.009626 Euro, November 2011).
c =1 if at least one household member works in the informal sector.
d =1 if the respondent declared that the household lives in an exclusively Roma neighbour-
hood.
e It refers to the highest level of education obtained by a household member.
f We use demeaned mark in Mathematics and Serbian. The mark is demeaned from the
average school mark.
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